White, Andrew R.

From: Lesley Plunkett <lesley.plunkett@icloud.com>
Sent: Sunday, November 01, 2026 10:54 AM
To: sctclerk@mssc.state.ms.us
Subject: Support for Oral Rehearing – Carly Madison Gregg | Case No. 2024-KA-01178-SCT

Follow Up Flag: Follow up
Flag Status: Flagged

ORIGINAL

[Some people who received this message don't often get email from lesley.plunkett@icloud.com. Learn why this is important at https://aka.ms/LearnAboutSenderIdentification]

FILED

NOV 01 2026

OFFICE OF THE CLERK
SUPREME COURT
COURT OF APPEALS

EXTERNAL EMAIL

To the Honourable Justices of the Supreme Court of Mississippi

Re: Carly Madison Gregg v. State of Mississippi Case No. 2024-KA-01178-SCT Support for Oral Rehearing, Clarification of Sentence and Formal Direction to MDOC

Dear Honourable Justices,

My name is Lesley Plunkett, and I am writing from Great Britain to respectfully express my strong support for Carly Madison Gregg's request for an oral rehearing.

I fully acknowledge the devastating loss of life in this case and the suffering experienced by the victims' loved ones. Nothing in this letter is intended to diminish that tragedy or the seriousness of the offences.

However, Carly was just 14 years old when these events occurred. I believe that her age, mental health, developmental maturity, right to a fair trial and potential for rehabilitation deserve the most careful consideration.

I respectfully ask the Court to address the following concerns.

1. Parole eligibility and the urgent need for a formal order to MDOC

My most pressing concern is the apparent discrepancy between the Supreme Court's determination regarding Carly's life sentences and the classification maintained by the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC).

I understand that the Court's decision of 20 August 2026 established that Carly's life sentences were not sentences of life without the possibility of parole.

Yet subsequent reporting indicated that MDOC had not received the formal direction required to amend her classification and continued to record her as ineligible for parole.

If this remains the position, I find it deeply troubling.

A judicial determination should not exist merely on paper while the authority administering the sentence continues to apply a different classification.

I respectfully ask the Court to issue a clear, written and enforceable order directing MDOC to:

- Correct Carly's sentencing and classification records to reflect her lawful parole eligibility.
- Remove any inaccurate designation of life imprisonment without parole.
- Establish the applicable statutory minimum period she must serve before parole consideration.
- Calculate and formally record her earliest lawful parole eligibility date.
- Confirm in writing that the corrected classification has been received and implemented.

I am not asking that Carly be guaranteed parole or immediately released.

I am asking that the possibility of parole, where provided by law, be made real, definite and administratively enforceable.

There must be a clearly identifiable minimum period before consideration for parole, rather than a life sentence whose practical meaning remains uncertain.

Without formal notification to MDOC, Carly may continue to be treated as ineligible despite the Court's ruling. This situation requires urgent clarification.

2. The importance of a minimum term and a meaningful opportunity for rehabilitation

A child sentenced to life imprisonment should have a lawful and meaningful opportunity to demonstrate growth, maturity and rehabilitation.

I recognise that any minimum term must comply with Mississippi law. Nevertheless, Carly's eligibility date should be calculated, recorded and communicated without further ambiguity.

Parole eligibility is not the same as release. It simply allows the appropriate authorities to assess, at the legally prescribed time, whether continued imprisonment remains necessary.

A person who committed an offence at 14 may be profoundly different after many years of adulthood, treatment, education and rehabilitation.

I respectfully ask that Carly not be deprived of that opportunity through an unresolved administrative classification.

3. The exceptionally rapid trial and immediate sentencing

I am concerned by the speed of Carly's trial and the immediate progression to sentencing.

My understanding is that no separate later sentencing date was scheduled after the guilty verdict, with the sentencing proceedings following directly.

For a 14-year-old facing the possibility of lifelong imprisonment, I question whether sufficient time was available for the fullest possible consideration of mitigation, psychiatric evidence, developmental maturity and rehabilitation.

I appreciate that the parties were permitted to address sentencing. However, the seriousness of the potential punishment makes the absence of a separate sentencing date particularly concerning to me.

The speed with which a case is concluded should never be more important than ensuring that a child's circumstances have been comprehensively examined.

I respectfully ask the Court to reconsider whether the proceedings afforded Carly the full procedural safeguards appropriate to her age and the gravity of the sentence.

4. Jury confusion over life imprisonment and parole

I am particularly troubled by the apparent confusion surrounding the sentencing options presented to the jury.

The distinction between life imprisonment with the possibility of parole and life imprisonment without parole is fundamental.

If jurors were given an inaccurate or confusing understanding of those alternatives, the reliability of the sentencing decision deserves careful examination.

The Court's subsequent clarification of the legal meaning of Carly's sentence does not necessarily answer whether the jury fully understood the options at the time.

I am also concerned by reported suggestions during sentencing that Carly could be released after a very short period if parole were available.

I respectfully ask whether such statements risked influencing jurors through fear rather than an accurate explanation of the law.

An oral rehearing would provide an important opportunity to examine the instructions, the sentencing arguments and the possible effect of any confusion.

5. Carly's mental health and developmental vulnerability

Carly's psychiatric history and the evidence concerning her mental health must be considered in the context of her age.

A 14-year-old is still undergoing substantial emotional, neurological and psychological development.

Children do not possess the same maturity, impulse control or ability to assess consequences as fully developed adults.

This does not excuse serious criminal conduct, but it is highly relevant to sentencing and rehabilitation.

I respectfully ask the Court to revisit the concerns raised about the psychiatric assessment process, the treatment of mental health evidence and the cumulative fairness of the proceedings.

6. Comparison with the murder of Erica Hall – Pike County, Mississippi, 2019

I respectfully draw the Court's attention to the criminal proceedings arising from the murder of Erica Hall, aged 32, in Pike County, Mississippi, on 4 January 2019.

A 14-year-old girl was charged as an adult in connection with her mother's death.

The accused child was released on bond in March 2019, approximately two months after the incident.

By November 2024, almost six years after the killing, the case had reportedly still not proceeded to trial.

The proceedings had also been transferred to Panola County following concerns regarding pretrial publicity, and a psychological evaluation had been ordered.

I recognise that pretrial release is legally different from imprisonment following conviction.

Nevertheless, I find the contrast with Carly's proceedings significant.

Both cases involved children aged 14 accused of extremely serious offences involving the death of a parent.

Yet one case involved years of pretrial proceedings, while Carly's case progressed to conviction and immediate sentencing in a comparatively short period.

I do not suggest that the defendant in the Erica Hall case should have been treated more harshly.

I ask only whether Carly received equally careful consideration of her youth, mental health, procedural rights and future prospects.

Case identification: Murder of Erica Hall, 4 January 2019, Pike County, Mississippi; proceedings subsequently transferred to Panola County. Official cause number to be confirmed.

7. Comparison with the murder of Alicia Michelle Vega – Warren County, Mississippi, 2011

I also ask the Court to consider the proceedings arising from the death of Alicia Michelle Vega, aged 32, who was fatally shot in Warren County, Mississippi, on 2 May 2011.

The accused was her 14-year-old stepdaughter.

This case involved prolonged proceedings, mental health evaluations, multiple delays and a trial in March 2014 that ended with a hung jury.

My understanding is that the defendant ultimately served approximately seven years in custody before being released.

If confirmed by the official court and correctional records, this outcome would provide a further relevant comparison involving a child of the same age accused of a grave offence within the family.

I appreciate that differences in charges, evidence, legal procedure, verdicts and sentencing arrangements may explain different outcomes.

I am not suggesting that any other child deserved greater punishment.

I am asking why Carly's case should not receive equally thorough consideration of the circumstances of her childhood, mental health and prospects for rehabilitation.

These comparisons are not presented as proof that Carly's sentence is unlawful. They illustrate why careful, individualised sentencing and accurate parole administration are so important when children face the possibility of lifelong imprisonment.

Case identification: Murder of Alicia Michelle Vega, 2 May 2011, Warren County, Mississippi. Official Circuit Court cause number to be confirmed.

8. The public identification and filming of Carly as a child

I would also like to express a concern from my perspective as someone living in Great Britain.

In the United Kingdom, important legal protections exist concerning the identification of children involved in criminal proceedings, although those protections are not absolute.

I understand that American laws and practices differ, and I raise this issue respectfully, not as criticism of another country.

Nevertheless, I was deeply troubled by the extensive publication of Carly's name, image and court appearances while she was still a child.

Her trial and sentencing received widespread publicity, and images of her appeared throughout news coverage and social media.

I believe the lasting consequences of this exposure deserve consideration, particularly in relation to a child's dignity, mental wellbeing and prospects for rehabilitation.

Children are children wherever they live.

A 14-year-old in Mississippi is no less deserving of humanity, developmental understanding and appropriate protection than a 14-year-old in Great Britain.

Different countries may apply different laws, but geographical location should not diminish the fundamental importance of protecting children.

9. My request for an oral rehearing and effective sentencing clarification

I respectfully support Carly's request for an oral rehearing so that the Court may give further consideration to:

- The accuracy and clarity of the jury's sentencing instructions.
- The effect of any confusion concerning life imprisonment and parole.
- The speed of the proceedings and immediate sentencing.
- The adequacy of consideration given to Carly's mental health, age and developmental maturity.
- The cumulative effect of any errors upon the fairness of the proceedings.
- The need for a definite, lawful and enforceable parole eligibility determination.

Most importantly, I ask that the Court ensure that MDOC receives a formal judicial directive requiring Carly's sentence to be correctly recorded as parole-eligible, to the extent required by the Court's ruling and applicable Mississippi law.

If the Court has already determined that Carly was not sentenced to life without parole, there should be no continuing administrative uncertainty about that determination.

I respectfully request that the appropriate minimum period before parole consideration be established under the governing statute and that her official eligibility date be calculated and recorded.

Carly should not have to rely on future administrative discretion simply to have the legal meaning of her sentence recognised.

10. Final appeal

I write as an ordinary member of the public from Great Britain, motivated by concern for fairness, the treatment of children and the proper administration of justice.

I do not overlook the terrible loss suffered by the victims' families.

Justice must acknowledge that suffering and protect the wider community.

But justice must also be accurate, proportionate and capable of recognising the possibility of change in someone who was only 14 years old.

I am not asking that Carly be excused from accountability.

I am asking that her sentence be legally clear, that her rights be fully protected and that she be afforded a genuine opportunity for rehabilitation and future parole consideration where the law permits it.

I sincerely hope the Court will grant careful consideration to her request for an oral rehearing and take whatever formal action is necessary to ensure that MDOC correctly implements the Court's determination.

A child should not lose the possibility of a future because of unclear sentencing instructions, unresolved administrative records or the failure to communicate a judicial decision.

Thank you for considering my concerns.

Yours faithfully,

Lesley Plunkett
Great Britain
United Kingdom
Sent from my iPhone