

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
No. 2024-KA-01178-SCT

CARLY MADISON GREGG
A/K/A CARLEY MADISON GREGG

APPELLANT

V.

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

APPELLEE

APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR REHEARING

On appeal from the Circuit Court of Rankin County, Mississippi
Trial Court # 61 CI1:24-cr-34169-JA

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INTRODUCTION

Carly Madison Gregg moves for rehearing under Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 40. The Court resolved the controlling statutory question in Gregg’s favor: for a juvenile convicted of first-degree murder after July 1, 2024, Mississippi Code Section 97-3-21(2)(b) authorizes “life imprisonment,” but not “life imprisonment without eligibility for parole.” *Gregg v. State*, No. 2024-KA-01178-SCT, slip op. ¶¶ 49–53 (Miss. Aug. 20, 2026). Yet the Court affirmed the sentences without directing any change to the sentencing order or to the manner in which the Mississippi Department of Corrections (“MDOC”) administers them. That gap leaves the Court’s statutory holding without an enforceable remedy. The gap is not theoretical. MDOC’s Deputy General Counsel advised appellate counsel in writing that MDOC’s Records Department classified Gregg as “life without parole.” **Ex. A.** That was MDOC’s official written position as of September 9, 2025. The email is offered only to demonstrate the concrete administrative consequence of the ambiguity and the need for an implementable mandate; the statutory issue is established by the opinion itself and does not depend upon the email. Nothing in the disposition—“AFFIRMED”—or in the mandate as presently framed requires MDOC to replace that classification with parole-eligible life.

Rule 40 asks whether the opinion overlooked or misapprehended a point of law or fact, not whether the losing party can restate its briefs. The principal guilt-phase point is narrow. The opinion recognized an unauthorized sanity-examination order and prejudicial literary evidence and condemned the categorical no-continuance pronouncement. But paragraph 47 addressed each item separately and then announced that the items did not combine. It did not examine their interaction on the only genuinely disputed issue—Gregg’s sanity. Cumulative-error doctrine requires that additional inquiry. On sentencing, the opinion also leaves its controlling statutory holding without an operative remedy, treats

the lawful wording of the verdict as an answer to a distinct instructional error, approves a *Miller* procedure for a punishment the Court held unavailable, and isolates an admitted parole misstatement from the instructions and the jury's written question. Rehearing is warranted. At the absolute minimum, the opinion and mandate should state unequivocally that Gregg is parole eligible and require the orders and reclassification necessary to give that holding effect

I. THE COURT SHOULD RECONSIDER CUMULATIVE ERROR BY ASSESSING THE ERRORS IN COMBINATION AND AGAINST THE ISSUE ACTUALLY TRIED.

A. Paragraph 47 repeats separate harmlessness conclusions; it does not perform the aggregate inquiry Ross requires.

The cumulative-error doctrine exists for the circumstance in which no single error, viewed alone, is declared outcome-determinative, but multiple errors together deprive the accused of a fundamentally fair trial. *Ross v. State*, 954 So. 2d 968, 1018 (¶ 138) (Miss. 2007) (citing *Byrom v. State*, 863 So. 2d 836, 847 (Miss. 2003)); see also *Walker v. State*, 913 So. 2d 198, 249 (¶ 204) (Miss. 2005). The doctrine would have no independent work to do if a court could resolve it simply by repeating that each component, considered by itself, was harmless. Its premise is that interaction may create prejudice not visible when each error is placed in a separate compartment.

Paragraph 47 proceeds component by component. It observes that the continuance issue lacked a denied motion and a specific showing of prejudice; that the mental-examination issue involved waiver, later reliance on insanity, and no identified compelled item that changed the verdict; and that the literary evidence was harmless in light of the record. Slip op. ¶ 47. It then concludes that the issues do not combine to undermine confidence in the convictions. *Id.* What is missing is the intervening analysis: how a fixed trial setting, premature mental-health process, and a vivid but clinically ungrounded literary analogy operated together on the jury's decision about sanity. The conclusion states the answer to the cumulative inquiry, but the preceding sentences perform only the individual inquiries.

Gregg does not ask the Court to add together claims it found wholly meritless. The opinion itself found that Rule 17.4 notice was a condition precedent to the sanity examination that the circuit court ordered; that the Crime and Punishment synopsis had little probative value, invited unfair reasoning by association, and should have been limited; and that the trial judge’s categorical statement was “in friction” with *Leonard*’s requirement of case-specific discretion. Slip op. ¶¶ 23, 33, 42–43; *Leonard v. Leonard*, 486 So. 2d 1240, 1241–42 (Miss. 1986). Thus, there were at least two acknowledged errors and a third condemned procedural condition. The no-continuance pronouncement need not be treated as a separately preserved reversible error to be considered as the real-world setting in which the acknowledged errors occurred.

B. The errors converged on the only genuinely disputed issue: sanity and criminal responsibility.

The opinion recognizes that Gregg “did not seriously dispute” that she committed the physical acts; her principal defense was insanity. Slip op. ¶ 8. The trial therefore did not turn on identity. It turned on whether, because of serious mental illness, dissociation, and possible medication effects, this fourteen-year-old understood the nature and quality of her acts and knew they were wrong under M’Naghten. Id. ¶¶ 8, 12–14. Dr. Andrew Clark explained why she did not. Dr. Jason Pickett interpreted the same circumstances as evidence of purpose, concealment, and appreciation of wrongfulness. Id. ¶¶ 12–13. The jury’s central task was to choose between competing explanations of mental state.

Every component of the cumulative claim bore on that choice. The court’s categorical docket position defined the time available to investigate and present a complex juvenile-insanity defense. The premature Rule 12.2(b) order altered the rules governing when the defense had to commit to, disclose, and litigate that defense. The counselor’s Crime and Punishment narrative then supplied the jury with a nonclinical story about a calculating “psychopath” who planned murder, was declared insane, and remained

unrepentant. Slip op. ¶¶ 39–42. These were not unrelated mistakes affecting different corners of an otherwise ordinary trial. They met on the same disputed question—how the jury should understand Gregg’s mind.

C. The no-continuance pronouncement supplied the setting in which the remaining errors operated.

The trial judge did not merely say that continuances were disfavored. While setting the case, the judge stated without qualification: “This Court does not continue cases.” Tr. 71–72. The opinion correctly explains why that language conflicts with the judicial duty to exercise discretion in light of circumstances that may arise later. Slip op. ¶ 23. A categorical rule matters even when counsel does not later file the motion the rule says will not be granted. It communicates that preserving the date—not evaluating future need—will control, and it shapes the choices counsel makes about experts, investigation, disclosure, and allocation of limited preparation time.

For cumulative-error purposes, the point is not that the statement alone automatically requires reversal. The point is that it cannot be severed from what followed. When the State sought an offense-time sanity examination before the defense had filed Rule 17.4(b) notice, the court accelerated the mental-health process rather than preserve the sequence the Rules require. Defense counsel asked that the defense expert be permitted to proceed first. Tr. 74–80. The order nevertheless issued while stating only that Gregg “may” raise insanity. Slip op. ¶ 33. The categorical calendar stance and premature examination order were two features of the same compressed process. Assessing them separately conceals that relationship.

The opinion faults Gregg for not proving exactly how the result would have changed if more time had been allowed. Slip op. ¶¶ 25–27. That may explain why the no-continuance point, standing alone, did not obtain relief. It does not erase the pronouncement from the cumulative record. Nor should a defendant be required to reconstruct with precision the investigation, consultation, or mitigation that a categorical

policy discouraged counsel from seeking time to develop. The observable consequence is that the case's central mental-health issue was forced through an unauthorized sequence under a fixed and compressed schedule.

D. The premature Rule 12.2(b) order caused process and strategic prejudice beyond admission of a compelled statement.

The Court's construction of Rules 12.2(b) and 17.4(b) is decisive: formal notice of an insanity defense is a condition precedent to a court-ordered examination of sanity at the time of the offense. Slip op. ¶¶ 32–33. The State's motion acknowledged that the predicate had not been satisfied, and the order anticipated a defense that Gregg only "may" raise. Id. ¶ 33. The order therefore was unauthorized when entered. Gregg's later decision to present insanity did not travel backward in time and supply the missing condition precedent.

The opinion's prejudice analysis looks principally for a particular compelled statement or sanity opinion that reached the jury. Id. ¶¶ 35–38. But the Rules protect more than the admissibility of a single statement. They prescribe who must act first and when: the defense investigates, decides whether it will rely on insanity, gives notice, and only then may the court compel the corresponding examination. That sequence protects the defense's ability to consult experts and test a possible theory before committing to it; prevents premature disclosure of strategy and mental-health direction; and keeps the State from obtaining the timing benefit of compulsory process before its entitlement arises.

Dr. Gugliano's decision not to render a sanity opinion reduced one consequence of the error; it did not restore the lost sequence. Nor does defense counsel's effort to manage the order by asking that the defense expert proceed first amount to agreement that the order was authorized. In the cumulative analysis, the relevant point is that the defense developed and presented its only contested theory after an unauthorized

order had accelerated that process and against a judicially announced determination that the trial date would not move. That process injury reinforces, rather than duplicates, the prejudice from the evidence later placed before the jury.

E. The Crime and Punishment testimony supplied a vivid, clinically colored shortcut for rejecting insanity.

The opinion carefully identifies the evidentiary problem. A treatment-note reference to the title did not open the door to a detailed synopsis emphasizing murder, psychopathy, insanity, punishment, and lack of remorse. The State supplied no connection between the novel's substance and Gregg's own thoughts, statements, or conduct. The resulting danger was precisely that jurors would reason by association: because Gregg read or wished to read a book about a murderer, her mind resembled the fictional murderer's. Slip op. ¶¶ 41–43. That is the precise type of unfair inference Mississippi Rule of Evidence 403 is designed to prevent. The Court concluded that the testimony should have been limited. Id. ¶ 43.

That danger was unusually acute here because the witness was Gregg's counselor and the disputed subject was mental condition. Even though Kirk did not purport to give an expert sanity opinion, the jury could naturally attach clinical significance to a counselor's discussion of material recorded in psychological-treatment notes. The prosecutor's chosen description did more than identify a book. It gave jurors a memorable narrative of calculated killing, a person labeled a "psychopath," a declaration of insanity, punishment, and unrepentance. That narrative mapped directly onto the very concepts the jury had to evaluate, while bypassing the safeguards and disciplined reasoning applicable to the competing psychiatric testimony.

Viewed alone, the Court found the literary evidence harmless. Slip op. ¶¶ 44–45. Viewed in context, it was the evidentiary culmination of the same mental-health process already affected by schedule pressure

and premature compulsion. The defense was required to litigate sanity on the accelerated timetable; the State then received permission to rebut that defense not only with Dr. Pickett's clinical analysis, but also with a sensational fictional analogue that the Court agrees had little probative value. The errors thus did not merely coexist. The earlier procedural irregularities increased the significance of the later unfair evidentiary shortcut.

F. Reliance on proof of the physical acts answers the wrong harmless-error question.

The opinion's harmlessness discussion emphasizes overwhelming proof that Gregg obtained and concealed the gun, shot her mother, used her mother's phone, concealed the camera, summoned friends, waited for her stepfather, shot at him, and fled. Slip op. ¶ 44. That evidence was powerful, and some of it was relevant to sanity. But its power to prove the physical sequence does not answer the issue the defense actually contested. The fact that Gregg committed purposeful-looking acts was common ground; what those acts revealed about her capacity to appreciate their nature and wrongfulness was the subject of opposing psychiatric explanations.

The correct prejudice question is therefore not whether the jury would still have found Gregg was the shooter. It is whether the Court can say, in a trial centered on M'Naghten sanity, that the combined effect of the compressed process, premature sanity order, and improper literary association could not have influenced the jury's choice between Dr. Clark and Dr. Pickett. Moffett's beyond-a-reasonable-doubt formulation requires the Court to ask whether the error contributed to the verdict actually disputed. *Moffett v. State*, 49 So. 3d 1073, 1099 (¶ 85) (Miss. 2010) (quoting *Brown v. State*, 995 So. 2d 698, 704 (Miss. 2008)). Overwhelming proof of an uncontested historical fact cannot substitute for that analysis.

G. The errors reinforced one another and undermined confidence in the sanity verdict.

The required aggregate analysis reveals a reinforcing sequence. First, the categorical no-continuance stance made the fixed trial date the premise for all preparation. Second, before the defense had invoked Rule 17.4(b), the court ordered the offense-time examination and compressed the decision and disclosure sequence governing the only contested defense. Third, when the case reached the jury, the State supplemented legitimate rebuttal evidence with a counselor-delivered story inviting the jury to associate Gregg with a calculating, unrepentant fictional murderer. Each step magnified the next: schedule pressure made premature process more consequential, and the distorted process made the unfair mental-state narrative more consequential.

This is the analysis paragraph 47 does not contain. The point is not that three small errors become reversible through arithmetic. It is that errors affecting preparation, compelled mental-health procedure, and the evidence by which jurors understood mental condition formed one chain directed at one issue. Because sanity was the defense and not a collateral matter, that chain undermines confidence in the verdict even though the evidence of the physical acts was overwhelming. *Ross* requires consideration of that combined effect before affirmance. 954 So. 2d at 1018 (¶ 138). The Court should grant rehearing, withdraw the affirmance of the convictions, and remand for a new trial.

The sentencing errors discussed below supply an additional and independent basis for relief. Gregg does not rely on post-verdict events to manufacture guilt-phase prejudice. Rather, the guilt-phase errors themselves require a new trial, while the erroneous sentencing instructions, parole arguments, and unresolved MDOC classification separately require a new sentencing proceeding or, at the minimum, an enforceable correction of the sentences and classification.

II. THE COURT'S STATUTORY HOLDING REQUIRES AN OPERATIVE PAROLE-

ELIGIBILITY DIRECTIVE.

A. “Life imprisonment” under Section 97-3-21(2)(b) cannot be administered as LWOP.

The opinion’s statutory construction is unambiguous. Subsection (2)(c) expressly permits a jury to impose either life imprisonment or life without parole for juvenile capital murder. Subsection (2)(b), enacted in the same amendment, permits only life imprisonment for juvenile first-degree murder. Slip op. ¶¶ 50–53. The Court therefore held that the Legislature intentionally withheld LWOP from subsection (2)(b), declined the State’s request to import Section 47-7-3’s parole bar, and required “life imprisonment” and “life imprisonment without eligibility for parole” to have different meanings. Id. ¶¶ 51–53. The necessary legal consequence is that Gregg’s Count I life sentence is parole eligible.

Paragraphs 56 and 72 do not supply that consequence. They say only that the verdict and order use the lawful label “life imprisonment,” while paragraph 66 says Gregg is “potentially eligible” for parole. Id. ¶¶ 56, 66, 72. Eligibility is not a possibility that can be left to administrative inference. Either a person is sentenced without eligibility for parole or she has a date on which she becomes eligible to be considered. Eligibility does not promise release and does not invade the Parole Board’s discretion; it determines only whether the Board may ever consider release. The Court should replace “potentially eligible” with an unequivocal holding that Gregg’s sentence is parole eligible.

B. The opinion should identify the governing calculation and address both life sentences.

The need for direction is particularly acute because Section 47-7-3(1)(d), read in isolation, bars parole for first-degree murder, while Section 97-3-21(2)(b), as construed by this Court, forbids treating this juvenile sentence as LWOP. The Court has already rejected the State’s effort to use the older general parole bar to nullify the later, juvenile-specific distinction. Slip op. ¶¶ 51–53. Once subsection (1)(d) cannot convert Gregg’s Count I sentence into LWOP, the existing general calculation for parole-eligible violent offenses

is Section 47-7-3(1)(h)(i)(2): fifty percent of the sentence or twenty years, whichever is less. For a life sentence, that yields eligibility after twenty years. If the Court intends a different mechanism or date, it should identify it rather than leave MDOC to continue the very classification the opinion rejects.

Count II also requires express treatment. The opinion recites the State's position that attempted murder is parole eligible under Section 47-7-3(1)(h)(i)(2) after fifty percent or twenty years, whichever is less, and concludes the sentence complies with *Graham* only because it is not LWOP. Slip op. ¶¶ 58–60; *Graham v. Florida*, 560 U.S. 48, 75, 82 (2010). An agency classification of either life sentence as LWOP can defeat the relief due on the other. The mandate therefore should state that both Count I and Count II are parole eligible, direct the circuit court to enter an amended sentencing order so stating, and require MDOC to reclassify Gregg and calculate an eligibility date. That would not grant parole; it would ensure only the meaningful opportunity for consideration that the opinion says the sentences permit.

III. THE INSTRUCTIONAL CLAIM IS NOT RESOLVED BY THE FACIAL WORDING OF THE VERDICT

The Court correctly found the "erroneous implication of the instructions" that "life imprisonment" and "life imprisonment with the possibility of parole" were separate authorized punishments. Slip op. ¶¶ 55–56. It also found that the jury's written question—"What is life in prison without parole? Years-wise"—confirmed that parole eligibility was central to deliberations and that the instructions did not produce a clear understanding of sentencing consequences. Id. ¶ 55. But the opinion then asked only whether the phrase written on the verdict and order—"life imprisonment"—appears in the statute. Id. ¶ 56; see *Grayer v. State*, 120 So. 3d 964, 969 (¶ 16) (Miss. 2013). That answers a facial-illegality question, not the instructional question Gregg presented.

A sentence may use words found in the statute and still require reversal when the jury selected it under a materially false description of the available punishments. Here the jury was told it could choose (1)

"life imprisonment," (2) "life imprisonment with the possibility of parole," or (3) inability to agree. It chose the first only after being told that the first and second meant different things. The Court cannot know whether the jury intended parole-eligible life; the only reliable record evidence points the other way. The jury asked about LWOP, the prosecutor expressly requested LWOP, and the verdict rejected the option labeled "with the possibility of parole." C.P. 1093–96; Tr. 1586:20–22; Court's Ex. 3. Recharacterizing the selected words after the fact cannot cure the process that produced them.

The error was prejudicial to the statutory decision entrusted to the jury. Section 97-3-21(2)(b) authorizes only two paths: a jury may knowingly fix punishment at the one lawful form of life imprisonment, or, if the jury does not do so, the court must impose twenty to forty years. Because this jury never received an accurate opportunity to make that choice, its verdict cannot establish that it knowingly fixed the parole-eligible life sentence the Court now attributes to it. At minimum, Counts I and II should be vacated for a new sentencing proceeding under correct instructions. If a properly instructed jury does not fix life on Count I, the trial court must impose twenty to forty years.

IV. ONCE LWOP WAS HELD UNAVAILABLE, THE MILLER DISCUSSION BECAME UNNECESSARY.

Miller governs the procedure required before a juvenile may receive "the harshest possible penalty for juveniles"—life without parole. *Miller v. Alabama*, 567 U.S. 460, 479, 489 (2012). But the Court held that Mississippi law did not make that penalty available for Gregg's first-degree-murder conviction, and *Graham* categorically forbids it for her attempted-murder conviction. Slip op. ¶¶ 51–53, 59. There was therefore no lawful *Miller* choice to be made on either count. Paragraphs 61 through 64 nevertheless approve the proceeding because Gregg supposedly had an opportunity to convince the jury that *Miller* prohibited LWOP. That conclusion cannot logically support affirmance after the Court held that the Legislature itself prohibited LWOP. A constitutional procedure cannot create a punishment the statute

withholds. The discussion also risks telling future courts that a *Miller* hearing may validate an otherwise unauthorized LWOP sentence. The Court should withdraw that discussion as unnecessary or expressly limit it by stating that *Miller* neither authorizes nor validates LWOP under Section 97-3-21(2)(b).

V. THE PAROLE MISSTATEMENT, INSTRUCTIONS, AND JURY QUESTION MUST BE CONSIDERED TOGETHER.

The prosecutor told the jury that, if parole were available, no one could guarantee Gregg would remain in prison for even one year. The Court correctly recognized that statement was wrong. Slip op. ¶ 66. The prosecutor also urged the jury to imagine Gregg, if released, entering schools, malls, grocery stores, and movie theaters. Id. ¶ 67. Those statements were not isolated from the instructions. They exploited the false choice between an option labeled merely "life" and an option labeled "life with the possibility of parole," and they supplied a fear-based reason to reject the expressly parole-eligible choice.

Paragraph 66 finds no harm because Gregg is "potentially eligible" for parole. That reasoning reverses the inquiry. The question is whether the jury selected punishment based on accurate law, not whether an appellate court might later construe the words it selected as potentially parole eligible. The jury's immediate question about what LWOP meant "years-wise" is direct proof that parole consequences mattered. The Court should evaluate the erroneous instruction, the admitted misstatement, the future-danger argument, and the question together. Their interaction defeats harmlessness and independently warrants a new sentencing proceeding.

VI. THE ALTERNATIVE RELIEF SHOULD BE EXPRESS, EXECUTABLE, AND COMPLETE.

If the Court does not grant a new trial or new sentencing proceeding, it should at least modify the opinion and mandate to prevent the statutory holding from being administered as its opposite. Gregg respectfully requests language materially equivalent to the following:

Carly Madison Gregg's sentence of life imprisonment on Count I is life with eligibility for parole; it is not and may not be classified or administered as life without parole. Her sentence of life imprisonment on Count II is likewise parole eligible. The Circuit Court of Rankin County shall enter an amended sentencing order expressly stating that both life sentences are parole eligible and shall transmit the amended order to MDOC. MDOC shall reclassify Gregg accordingly and calculate her parole-eligibility date under the governing statutes. This directive does not guarantee release on parole; it guarantees eligibility for consideration.

The Court should further state whether Section 47-7-3(1)(h)(i)(2) supplies the calculation for Count I—as it does for Count II—and, if not, identify the applicable calculation. An unqualified affirmance coupled with "potential" eligibility leaves Gregg to begin a separate administrative and collateral-review process over a legal question this Court has already decided. A precise mandate will avoid that needless litigation, ensure uniform application of the new juvenile statute, and preserve the distinction the Legislature deliberately drew

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, Gregg respectfully requests that the Court grant rehearing and:

1. withdraw the opinion's affirmance, vacate the convictions, and remand for a new trial based on cumulative error;
2. alternatively, vacate the sentences on Counts I and II and remand for a new sentencing proceeding before a properly instructed jury, with an express instruction that LWOP is unavailable on Count I and constitutionally unavailable on Count II;
3. if a properly instructed jury does not fix punishment at parole-eligible life on Count I, direct the circuit court to impose a term of twenty to forty years under Section 97-3-21(2)(b);
4. withdraw or substantially modify paragraphs 61 through 64 to make clear that *Miller* does not authorize or validate a punishment the governing statute withholds; and

5. at the absolute minimum, modify the opinion and mandate to declare unequivocally that Gregg is parole eligible on Counts I and II; direct the circuit court to enter and transmit an amended sentencing order so stating; direct MDOC to reclassify her as parole eligible and calculate her eligibility date; and identify the statutory timetable governing Count I.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, James H. Murphy, counsel for the Appellant, hereby certify that I have this day filed by means of the electronic case filing system the foregoing Motion for Rehearing, pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 25 by which immediate notification to the all ECF participants in this cause is made:

In addition, the following non-ECF participants are served by first class mail, postage prepaid, on September 17, 2026:

Hon. Judge Dewey Arthur
Circuit Judge, 20th Circuit Court District
PO Box 1599
Brandon, Mississippi 39043

Hon. John K. "Bubba" Bramlett, Jr., 20th Circuit Court District Attorney
Hon. Kathryn W. Newman, Assistant 20th Circuit Court District Attorney
215 East Government St., 2nd Floor
Brandon, MS 39042

SO CERTIFIED, this the 17th day of September, 2026.

/s/ James H. Murphy

EXHIBIT "A" TO MOTION FOR REHEARING

RE: Carly Madison Gregg MDOC ID Number 252702

From Cockrell, Courtney <CouCockrell@mdoc.state.ms.us>

Date Tue 9/9/2025 4:04 PM

To Stephanie Bates <sbates@msattorney.com>

Cc Lance Mixon <lmixon@msattorney.com>

Good Afternoon,

I confirmed with our Records Department that she is currently classified as life without parole.

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From: Stephanie Bates <sbates@msattorney.com>

Sent: Monday, September 8, 2025 1:36 PM

To: Cockrell, Courtney <CouCockrell@mdoc.state.ms.us>

Cc: Lance Mixon <lmixon@msattorney.com>

Subject: Carly Madison Gregg MDOC ID Number 252702

Good afternoon Ms. Cockrell I'm sending this email on behalf Lance Mixon. He is assisting with the appellate brief, and we wanted to know how MDOC classifies her? Is it life with or without possibility of parole?

Stephanie Bates, Paralegal

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